The physical layer security of uplink non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) is analyzed. A stochastic geometry approach is applied to analyze the coverage probability and effective secrecy throughput (EST) of the kth NOMA user, where a fixed or an adaptive transmission rate can be used. We consider a protected zone around the legitimate terminals to establish an eavesdropper-exclusion area. We assume that the channel state information associated with eavesdroppers is not available at the base station. We also consider that the base station is equipped with multiple antennas. The impact of imperfect successive interference cancellation is also taken into account in this paper. Our framework allows to compute, numerically, the wiretap code rates that maximize the EST. In addition, our framework also allows an optimum selection of other system parameters, such as the transmit power or the eavesdropper-exclusion radius.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has recently been introduced as a new feature intended to increase the spectrum efficiency in the fifth generation (5G) networks [1] , [2] . This technique allows serving multiple users simultaneously using the same spectrum resources at the cost of increased intra-cell interferences [3] . NOMA may use the power domain jointly with interference cancellation techniques to separate signals, exploiting the path-loss differences among users.
In uplink (UL) NOMA, a set of users transmits simultaneously their signals to their associated base station (BS). As a consequence, the received signal of a particular user suffers from intra-cluster interference, which is a function of the channel statistics of other users. In order to minimize such interference, the BS may apply successive interference cancellation (SIC) to decode signals. SIC technique requires
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Yong Zeng. that different message signals arrive to the receiver (BS) with a sufficient power difference so that SIC may be successfully applied. This is typically achieved in the downlink (DL) by means of different weights at the transmitter. However, since the UL channel gains already provide sufficient distinctness between the received signals, such weights are not necessary. In fact, the conventional UL transmit power control intended to equalize the received signal powers of users is not recommended for UL NOMA transmissions since it may remove channel distinctness [3] .
SIC technique in UL NOMA works as follows. The BS first decodes the strongest signal by considering the signals from other users as noise. However, the user with the weakest signal enjoys zero intra-cluster interference since the BS has previously canceled interfering signals (considering ideal conditions). If we consider the possibility of a SIC failure, the error is propagated to all remaining messages.
UL NOMA was firstly presented in [4] , by considering the minimum mean squared error (MMSE)-based SIC decoding at the BS. An interesting survey on NOMA for 5G networks is presented in [5] , which provides a comprehensive overview of the latest NOMA research results and innovations. A novel dynamic power allocation scheme for DL and UL NOMA is proposed in [6] . The outage performance and the achievable sum data rate for UL NOMA is theoretically analyzed in [7] . In [8] , a framework to analyze multi-cell UL NOMA with stochastic geometry is presented. In [9] , the optimum received UL power levels using a SIC detector is determined analytically for any number of transmitters.
The possibility of having a secure communication in NOMA-based scenarios is also a current hot topic. The presence of eavesdroppers (EDs) is a classical problem in communication theory, ever since Wyner introduced the wiretap channel [10] . In the last years, the field of physical layer security over different scenarios has taken an important interest in the research community as a means to provide reliable secure communications, relaxing the complexity and complementing the performance of the required cryptographic technologies. For instance, the work in [11] considers the secure transmission of information over an ergodic fading channel in the presence of an ED. An extension of this work considering a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel is analyzed in [12] . In [13] , an analysis is conducted on the probability of secrecy capacity for wireless communications over Rician fading channels. The communication between two legitimate peers in the presence of an external ED in the context of free-space optical (FSO) communications is analyzed in [14] . In [15] , a comprehensive survey on various multiple-antenna techniques in physical layer security is provided, with an emphasis on transmit beamforming designs for multiple-antenna nodes. An overview on the state-of-theart works on physical layer security technologies that can provide secure communications in wireless systems is given in [16] .
In the particular field of physical layer security with NOMA, a small number of contributions are available. A simple scenario for a DL NOMA with just one ED (with single antenna configuration) in a single cell is addressed in [17] . An analysis of the optimal power allocation policy that maximizes the secrecy sum rate for a DL NOMA scenario is presented in [18] . In [19] , a cooperative NOMA system with a single relay is analyzed assuming that NOMA users are affected by an ED. The work in [20] analyzes the secrecy outage probability (SOP) in a single-cell DL NOMA scenario in which the EDs are not part of the cellular system. Reference [21] extends previous work by proposing several mechanisms to enhance the SOP in a DL NOMA multi-antenna aided transmission. In [22] , a DL NOMA scenario with multiple-input single-output (MISO) is addressed, proposing a secure beamforming transmission scheme. The secrecy performance of a two-user DL NOMA with transmit antenna selection schemes is analyzed in [23] . The work in [24] studies the secrecy performance of a downlink of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) scenario, focusing on the impact of a max-min transmit antenna selection strategy.
A. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
As described before, most recent literature dealing with a physical layer security characterization of NOMA is focused on the DL [21] - [24] . Hence, its use on an UL setup is one of the novel contributions of this paper. To the best of the authors' knowledge, the only work dealing with this scenario [25] does not incorporate random spatial locations of EDs since locations are deterministic (i.e. it does not use a stochastic geometry approach) and does not consider the effect of the protection radius around the legitimate users (LUs).
The main technical differences and challenges on analyzing the physical layer security in UL NOMA from the existing studies for DL NOMA are the following:
• In the UL NOMA, the BS receives transmissions from all users simultaneously, and consequently, intra-cell interference to a given user is a function of the channel statistics of other users within the cell; however, in DL NOMA, the intra-cell interference to a user is a function of its own channel statistics [8] .
• Intra-cluster interfering signals in the UL NOMA are also the desired signals; therefore, it is not possible to provide the benefits of SIC, i.e. enhance the Signal-to-Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR) unequivocally for all users.
• In the UL NOMA, EDs are randomly positioned near the N legitimate transmitters, independently of the transmitters' location within the cell, whereas in the DL NOMA, the BS is the unique transmitter, thus simplifying the scenario.
In this work, we provide the following contributions:
1) We provide a detailed characterization of an UL NOMA scenario for a generic number of simultaneous users. The analysis is given both from a connection level perspective and from a physical layer security viewpoints. We provide new analytical expressions for UL NOMA at the BS with multiple antennas, random spatial locations of EDs and a protection radius around the LUs to enhance the secrecy metrics. This scenario has not been addressed yet to the best of the authors' knowledge. 2) We analyze the effective secrecy throughput (EST) for UL NOMA as a performance metric that captures the two key features of wiretap channels (reliability and secrecy). We provide analytical expressions for the EST, which captures explicitly the reliability constraint and secrecy constraint of wiretap channels. Our analysis allows determining numerically the wiretap code rates that achieve the maximum EST. Additionally, it also helps designing optimum values of the transmit power and the ED-exclusion radius in order to enhance the overall EST.
3) We analyze previous metrics under two different scenarios: fixed and adaptive transmission schemes from legitimate users (LUs). In the case of fixed transmission rate, our analysis includes the impact of an imperfect SIC during NOMA detection.
B. ORGANIZATION AND NOTATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The system model under analysis is introduced in Section II. The analysis of the SINR distributions for both LUs and EDs is presented in Section III. In Section IV, analytical expressions for the EST under different scenarios are derived. Numerical results are shown and described in Section V. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section VI. Notation: Throughout this paper, E[·] stands for the expectation operator and P for the probability measure. Random variables (RV) are represented with capital letters whereas lower case is reserved for deterministic values and parameters. If X is a RV, f X (·), F X (·),F X (·) and L X (·) represent its probability density function (pdf), cumulative distribution function (cdf), complementary cdf (ccdf) and Laplace transform of its pdf, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We focus on the UL communication scenario in which LUs are connected to a BS centered at the origin, with an associated serving cell of radius r c . We assume a single cell scenario, as considered in most previous studies related to NOMA [1] , [6] , [7] , [9] , [18] , [20] , [21] , [26] . A number of EDs (EDs) are randomly distributed along the whole plane, attempting to intercept the communication between LUs and BS. The spatial distribution of EDs is modeled using a homogeneous Poisson Point Process (PPP) uniformly distributed in R 2 , which is denoted by e and associated with a density λ e . The spatial distribution of EDs is modeled using a Poisson Point Process (PPP) distributed in R 2 , which is denoted by e and associated with a density λ e . An ED-exclusion zone of radius r p (in which no EDs are allowed to roam) is introduced around the LUs for improving the secrecy performance, as it is also considered in [21] for the DL. Hence, e can be considered as an inhomogeneous PPP with λ e > 0 density outside the exclusion radius and λ e = 0 inside that region. Fig. 1 shows the system model under analysis.
At each radio resource, the BS gives service to N simultaneous LUs (using NOMA), whose positions are random inside the cell. We assume a random scheduling, i.e. the BS selects randomly the set of N LUs to be scheduled in a given radio resource according to NOMA. The locations of the LUs that are scheduled in a single radio resource are assumed to be uniformly distributed in the cell. Hence, we consider that the resulting set of points (LUs) inside the disk B(0, r c ) is a Binomial Point Process (BPP) B with N points, as it is normally assumed in the literature [7] , [26] . The assumption of a BPP for LUs (instead of a PPP) is due to tractability issues, but at the same time, it provides the necessary spatial correlation between the nodes that are served by the BS. We assume that both LUs and EDs are equipped with a single antenna each whereas the BS is equipped with M uncorrelated receive antennas and applies a Maximal Ratio Combining (MRC) reception. We also assume that LUs' channels and EDs' channels are subject to independent quasi-static Rayleigh fading with equal block length. UL transmit power control is not recommended as justified in the introduction section, and hence, it is not used.
We also consider that the EDs apply the same SIC method than the BS in order to separate the signals from each transmitter, so that they can technically compromise the communication from each user in the network (and specially if colluding EDs are considered, which is not the case in this paper). That is, the EDs measure the received signal power and first decodes the strongest signal by treating other signals as noise. Afterwards, it cancels the first decoded signal and continues decoding the second strongest signal, and so on. We consider the most detrimental ED scenario in order to simplify the code rate design.
As stated in [3] , the impact of the path-loss factor is generally more dominant than channel fading effects. Hence, for tractability reasons, we assume that ordering of the received signal powers can be approximately achieved by ordering the distances of the users to their serving BS. Let R k be the distance between the kth user and the BS, being R 1 ≤ R k ≤ R N . Power loss due to propagation is modeled using a standard path-loss model with α > 2, whereas a Rayleigh model is assumed for small-scale fading. Hence, the received signal power at a distance R k can be simply computed as
where H k is the equivalent channel power gain for the kth user after multiple antenna processing at the receiver.
We consider a scenario in which EDs are not a part of the cellular system (passive eavesdropping) and therefore, the channel state information (CSI) associated with EDs' channel is not available at the BS. Note that LUs might be aware of the presence of a potential ED in their surrounding area, simply by a visual inspection, thus guaranteeing the ED-exclusion zone during their transmission.
Let R s be the secrecy rate in a legitimate link, i.e. the rate of transmitted confidential information. This rate can be computed as:
where R b represents the codeword rate from the LU to the BS, i.e. rate at which the codeword is transmitted, including the confidential message and redundancy; R e quantifies the redundancy rate, i.e. rate associated with redundant information for providing physical layer security in the message transmission. Roughly, a larger R e provides a higher secrecy level.
On the one hand, if we select a codeword rate such that R b ≤ C b (being C b the capacity of the legitimate channel), a reliability constraint is ensured. On the other hand, if the redundancy rate is above the capacity of the ED's channel, i.e. R e > C e , a secrecy constraint is achieved.
Depending on whether the CSI of LU and ED links are available at the BS, such rates can be adapted to the channel or not. In that sense, we address two different cases regarding the LUs transmission mode:
• Fixed transmission rate: LUs transmit their information towards their BS at a fixed rate. In this scenario, we find the optimum values for the wiretap code rates, taking into account the reliability outage probability that occurs when the selected fixed rate exceeds the instantaneous channel capacity.
• Adaptive transmission rate: the BS enforces an adaptive secure transmission from LUs assuming a perfect channel estimation. In this scenario, we find the optimum value of the redundancy rate, R e , that maximizes the secrecy performance. Note that, although the fixed rate transmission is expected to achieve a worst performance compared to the adaptive transmission, it is here included as a baseline to evaluate the gain of the latter case. Additionally, our analysis could be also extended to other type of communications (sensor networks, etc.) in which the fixed rate case might be the best solution for a very simple device.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE SINR DISTRIBUTIONS
First, we analyze the connection related statistics of this scenario using a stochastic geometry approach. We assume that the BS applies SIC to detect the UL transmission from the nearest user first, and afterwards, it continues decoding the information from other users up to user N .
Let us denote the receive signal at the j th antenna port
where g
j indicates the amplitude fading channel coefficient between the i th user transmitter and the j th antenna port, x i denote the message symbols from the i th user with E{|x i | 2 } = 1, n j is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) term, P T is the transmit power, N is the number of users and j = 1 . . . M , with M being the number of receive antennas. According to the system model here considered, all fading channel coefficients are normalized Rayleigh RVs with E{|g
M ] and r = [r 1 . . . r M ], the output of the MRC combiner to decode the message x k is given by [27, eq. (26) ] as
where H denotes the Hermitian transpose, * the complex conjugate operation and n eq is an equivalent noise term. With these definitions, the received instantaneous SINR at the BS for the k th user is defined as
where ρ b represents the transmit signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) defined as
, being σ 2 b the noise power at the BS. In this equation, the term I represents the intra-cluster interference due to other NOMA users, which is related to the underlying amplitude fading coefficients as follows:
where the individual interference terms are given as
We note that according to [27, eq. (30) ], it follows that v i is a complex Gaussian RV (and notably, independent of H k ) if the individual gains are Rayleigh distributed, which is the case under consideration. Note that, since we consider a MRC reception technique at the BS, the desired signal is given by the sum of M independent unit-mean exponentially distributed random variables, yielding a Gamma distribution with ccdf given by
Note that (4) represents the SINR associated with the decoding process of the message from user k subject to the correct decoding process from previous NOMA users (from user 1 to k −1) so that their intra-cluster interference has been successfully canceled. Also note that the SINR expression for the last user is simplified to γ N = ρ b H N R −α N since the intra-cluster interference has been completely canceled.
A. DISTRIBUTION OF THE SINR OF LEGITIMATE USERS
In this section we compute the coverage probability of the LUs, i.e. the ccdf of their received SINR at the BS, which represents the probability for a user to have a SINR higher than a given threshold t.
Lemma 1: In the case of M antennas at the BS, the ccdf of the SINR for the kth user, p k (t), is given bȳ
with ψ = tr α k and
the Gauss hypergeometric function defined in [28] (Ch. 15) ,
) the beta function, which is expressible in terms of Gamma functions as B(a, b) = (a) (b)/ (a + b). Note that (8) just includes one finite integral, which can be also computed by the Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature relationship [29] .
Proof: See Appendix A. As mentioned before, due to the exclusion regions considered in the scenario, the locations of EDs have been modeled as an inhomegeneous PPP, where the exclusion regions are treated as a disk centered around the target LU. Taken into account this assumption, our theoretical analysis represents an approximation, since the analysis does not consider the exclusion regions from other LUs. This approximation actually represents an upper bound for the coverage probability since the distance between the LU and the EDs will be statistically higher if the exclusion regions from other LUs are taken into account.
Corollary 1: In the case of single antenna (M = 1) at the BS, the ccdf of the SINR for the kth user, p k (t), is simplified toF
10) Corollary 2: In the case of single antenna (M = 1) at the BS, the coverage probability for the farthest user (N ) is simplified tō
where (·, ·) stands for the upper incomplete Gamma function. Proof: The farthest user (N ) experiences no intra-cluster interference, so its coverage probability can be expressed as
After minor manipulations, the proof is complete.
B. DISTRIBUTION OF THE SNR OF EAVEDROPPERS
We address the worst-case scenario, in which EDs are assumed to have strong detection capabilities. Specifically, by applying multi-user detection techniques, the multi-user data stream received at the BS can be also distinguished by the EDs. We consider the most detrimental ED, which is not necessarily the nearest one, but the one having the best channel to the LU that is transmitting towards the BS. Therefore, the instantaneous received SNR at the most detrimental ED (with respect with any LU) can be expressed as follows:
where ρ e represents the transmit SNR defined as ρ e = P T σ 2 e , being P T transmit power at the LU; σ 2 e is the AWGN power received at the ED; H e stands for the channel power gain received at the ED from the LU. Since both ED and LU are equipped with a single antenna, H e follows an exponential distribution.
Lemma 2: Assuming an ED-exclusion zone of radius r p around the LUs, the cdf of the SNR for the most detrimental ED can be computed as follows:
F γ e (t)= exp − 2πλ e 2/α,r α p t/ρ e α(t/ρ e ) 2/α (14) Proof: Taking into account that EDs follow a PPP distribution, we can express the cdf of the SNR for the most detrimental ED as follows: (15) where (a) comes from the Probability Generating Functional (PGFL) [30] . Solving the last integral, the proof is complete.
In the particular case of no ED-exclusion zone, (14) is simplified to:
IV. SECRECY RATE METRICS
Most of previous works on physical layer security compute the secrecy capacity as [31] , although this definition implicitly requires that both C b and C e are available. In our scenario, this assumption is not realistic since EDs are not part of the cellular system. Subsequently, we do not use the typical information-theoretic formulation related to the secrecy capacity but a recent formulation of a new metric, referred to as the effective secrecy throughput (EST) [32] , which captures both the reliability constraint and the secrecy constraint as independent terms.
In order to ensure secrecy, two different constraints are to be considered. On the one hand, a reliability constraint is based on the fact that the error probability at the receiver decreases with increasing code length; therefore, if we select a codeword rate such that R b ≤ C b (being C b the capacity of the legitimate channel), the reliability constraint is ensured. On the other hand, a secrecy constraint is based on the fact that the fraction of information leakage to the ED decreases with increasing code length; therefore, if the redundancy rate is above the capacity of the ED's channel, i.e. R e > C e , the secrecy constraint is achieved.
The EST of a wiretap channel quantifies the average secrecy rate at which the messages are transmitted from the LUs to the BS without being leaked to the EDs, and can be defined as 17) where the term (R b − R e ) represents the rate of transmitted confidential information, i.e. R s ; and the term [ 
quantifies the probability that the information is securely transmitted from the LUs to the BSs, being [1 − O r (R b )] associated with the reliability constraint and [1 − O r (R e )] associated with the secrecy constraint. We assume a normalized bandwidth W = 1, and therefore, secrecy rate and capacity metrics are measured in bits/s.
We have chosen the EST as a secrecy performance metric in this paper as it allows for explicitly designing the wiretap code rates that satisfy certain reliability and secrecy constraints. This is not the case when using conventional secrecy metrics such as the Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP) P(C s < R s ) (where R s is defined as the threshold rate under which secure communication cannot be achieved) or the probability of strictly positive secrecy capacity P(C s > 0). Besides, and despite being a relatively recent performance metric, the EST has been used in numerous recent works [25] , [32] - [40] . Additionally, the evaluation of the SOP poses an additional challenge from an analytical perspective in this specific scenario, since it includes an additional infinite integral.
A. ADAPTIVE TRANSMISSION RATE
In this scenario, the BS enforces an adaptive transmission scheme from LUs in the UL.
Theorem 1: The EST for the NOMA kth user in case of adaptive transmission is given by
whereF γ k (·) and F γ e (·) were given in (10) and (14), respectively. Proof: In case of adaptive transmission, R b can be optimally chosen as R b = C b , and hence, the reliability constraint can be always guaranteed, i.e. the reliability outage probability is zero: O r (R b ) = 0. Therefore, the EST for the NOMA kth user can be defined as
where the term C k represents the ergodic capacity for the kth user. Note that, in the adaptive transmission scheme, R e is adjusted within the constraint 0 < R e < C k . Since R b = C b , we need to guarantee that C b = log 2 (1 + γ b ) > R e , that is, γ b > 2 R e − 1. Therefore, assuming a normalized channel bandwidth W = 1, the average capacity for the kth user, C k , can be expressed as
Using integration by parts with u = log 2 (1 + γ ), dv = f γ k (γ ) and v = − 1 − F γ k (γ ) , the average capacity can be also expressed as
The secrecy outage probability term can be computed as O s (R e ) = P(R e < C e ) = P(γ e > 2 R e − 1)
Substituting (22) and (21) into (19) , the proof is complete.
Remark 1 (Impact of EDs density, λ e ): In view of Theorem 1, it can be deduced that, for λ e = 0, the term associated with the secrecy constraint, O r (R e ), is null; hence, the EST is mainly determined by the capacity of the LU's link. On the other hand, the EST tends to zero as λ e grows since expression (18) always satisfies that lim λ e →∞ k (R e ) = 0, ∀r p ∈ [0, ∞); this is due to the fact that the fading distribution introduces a non-null probability of having a higher instantaneous capacity for the ED than for the legitimate user.
Remark 2 (Impact of ED-exclusion radius, r p ): In view of expression (18) , it can be noted that the only term that depends on r p is the cdf of the SNR of the worst ED, F γ e 2 R e − 1 ; for r p = 0, this term is simplified to (16) , whereas for r p → ∞, this term satisfies that F γ e 2 R e − 1 | r p →∞ = 1, that is, EDs do not have any impact on the EST performance.
B. FIXED TRANSMISSION RATE
In case the LUs use a fixed transmission rate, the reliability constraint cannot be always guaranteed, i.e. a reliability outage must be taken into account as
Therefore, an outage may occur whenever a message transmission is either unreliable or non secure.
Regarding the reliability constraint term, O r (R b ), we address in our analysis the impact of imperfect SIC and detection probability for NOMA. Note that the signals from the intra-cluster interfering users may or may not be decoded perfectly; therefore, SIC may or may not be performed in a perfect fashion. As a consequence, we distinguish two cases: perfect and imperfect SIC.
The reliability constraint term for user k in the case of perfect SIC, named as p (P) k , is given by
That is, the reliability constraint term represents the detection probability for user k, whose expression was obtained in (10) . Finally, the EST for user k in case of perfect SIC can be expressed as
However, in the case of imperfect SIC, the intra-cluster interference experienced by the kth user depends on whether the detection for the k − 1 nearest users were successful or not, which complicates the model significantly. In this paper we assume the worst case of imperfect SIC, which considers that the decoding of the kth user is always unsuccessful whenever the decoding of his relative k − 1 closest users is unsuccessful [8] . Therefore, the reliability constraint term for the worst-case detection probability of kth user is given by:
Finally, the EST for user k in case of imperfect SIC can be expressed as
Note that the EST expression is the same for the first NOMA user independently of the SIC assumption, i.e. A summary of secrecy metric expressions for different scenarios is shown in Table 1 .
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, analytical results are illustrated and validated with extensive Monte Carlo simulations in order to assess the physical layer security in UL NOMA. We conduct a thorough performance comparison between the adaptive and fixed rate transmission schemes in terms of EST. Main parameters are presented in Table 2 unless otherwise stated.
A. DETECTION PROBABILITY
In the case of fixed transmission rate, the reliability constraint term (or equivalently, the detection probability) plays an important role in NOMA performance. Let us analyze first this contribution separately. k . In this case, we have considered a high number of simultaneous NOMA LUs (N = 6) randomly positioned according to a BPP in order to evaluate the performance as k grows. In the case of perfect SIC, results show that detection probability is not a monotonically decreasing function with k (i.e. with the distance from the kth user to the BS); instead, farthest LUs are boosted since the intra-cluster interference term has been partially (or totally) canceled. Note that the best result is achieved for the farthest user, k = N = 6, since perfect SIC assumes that intra-cluster interference is fully canceled. However, in the case of imperfect SIC, the intra-cluster interference experienced by the kth user depends on whether the detection for k − 1 nearer users were successful or not, thus providing a monotonically decreasing function with k. Note also that higher values of R b lead to a lower detection probability.
In the case that all LUs are located at the same distance from the BS, then the theoretical analysis is simplified considerably as Eq. (28) step (a) is not conditioned on the distance r k , leading to the following expression:
with ψ = tr α k , being r k the deterministic distance from all LUs to the BS.
In the case of single antenna at the BS (M = 1), this expression is further simplified to:
Note that although all the users are located at the same distance, the expression still depends on the index k, which represents the user that is being decoded iteratively. 
Fig. 3 shows the detection probability results in case all
LUs are located at the same distance from the BS, which has been set to 2r c /3. This is the average distance of random points within a disc of radius r c . If we compare the results with previous figure, we can observe that in the case of perfect SIC, results show that detection probability is a monotonically increasing function with k; this is so because users that are decoded later experience lower intra-cluster interference as it has been previously canceled. However, in the case of imperfect SIC with all the users located at the same distance, the performance is very poor compared to the random case. Note that SIC technique requires that different message signals arrive to the BS with a sufficient power difference so that SIC may be successfully applied. In this case, this assumption is not satisfied, thus degrading significantly the performance, specially for the latest decoded users. Fig. 4 shows the detection probability results for LUs with imperfect SIC, p (I ) k , and for EDs, p e , versus the SINR threshold t = 2 R b − 1. Results for p (I ) k are obtained from (26) considering N = 4 NOMA LUs. The detection probability of EDs, p e , is also shown for different values of the exclusion area radius, r p . Since we consider the most detrimental ED, i.e. the one receiving the best channel quality from the LU, the detection probability results for the EDs may outperform the results for LUs as r p is decreased, assuming a density of EDs of λ e = 1e-5 points/m 2 (default value). The fact that the ED outperforms the LU in terms of detection probability is detrimental from a physical layer security perspective, although it may be compensated by increasing the exclusion area radius, as shown in the figure. Results also show the detection probability for LUs in case of different number of antennas at the BS, leading to an important improvement as M grows. 
B. EST FOR FIXED TRANSMISSION RATE
In this section we provide EST performance results in case the BS uses a fixed transmission scheme. Fig. 5 shows the EST for fixed rate transmission scheme and perfect SIC versus R b and R e , (P) k (R b , R e ). We observe that there is a unique pair of R b and R e that maximizes the EST. Note that EST results are zero for R e ≥ R b , as defined in (1) . Fig. 6 shows the value of R e that maximizes the EST, noted as R † e , as a function of λ e and R b (being R e ≤ R b ), with N = 2, k = 1 and r p = 50 m. Facing the impossibility of reaching an analytical expression of the optimum value of R e , it has been determined numerically from (21) . Note that the ratio between R † e and R b is not linear. We also observe that a higher density of EDs requires a higher redundancy rate to optimize the EST. EST results are shown for N = 2 NOMA users as a function of R b , assuming a value of R e = 3 bps and r p = 50 m. We observe that the results for the first user (k = 1) are the same for perfect and imperfect SIC since imperfect SIC models the propagation of decoding errors from previous decoded users. We also observe that, in the case of perfect SIC, the maximum EST for the second user is not degraded significantly compared to the first user, as the larger distance to the BS is compensated by the fact that the second user does not experience (ideally) any intra-cluster interference. However, in the case of imperfect SIC, the second user is highly degraded compared to the first user due to SIC error propagation from the previous decoded user. Note also that the value of R b that maximizes the EST is different of each LU, so optimum code rate selection at the BS must be done per LU. Fig. 8 shows the value of the minimum ED-exclusion radius (r p min ) that ensures a certain EST value. Results are shown for the first user (k = 1), with N = 2, as a function of the ED density (λ e ). It is observed that a higher ED-exclusion radius is require to achieve the minimum EST target as λ e or ρ e is increased. It is also observed that for low λ e values, there is no need to include an exclusion area to achieve the EST target.
C. EST FOR ADAPTIVE TRANSMISSION RATE
In this section we provide EST performance results in case the BS uses the CSI of LUs to enforce an adaptive transmission scheme.
The impact of the ED-exclusion radius on the EST is depicted in Fig. 9 . We observe an increasing S-shape behavior as r p grows, since the most detrimental ED reduces its detection capabilities for higher r p values. Results match perfectly with Remark 2, which stated that for r p → ∞, EDs do not have any impact on the performance.
EST results as a function of the density of EDs, λ e , is shown in Fig. 10 . We observe an exponential decreasing behavior with λ e . As stated in Remark 1, when λ e tends to zero, the EST is mainly determined by the capacity of the LU's link; on the contrary, when λ e tends to infinity, the EST is zero, although higher ED-exclusion radii lead to a slower EST degradation. Results also show the performance gain as the number of antennas M is increased. Fig. 11 shows the EST for adaptive transmission for the kth user as a function of the transmission power (P T ) of the LU measured in dBm/Hz. We observe an optimum value of P T , which depends on the specific values of ρ e and k. We have considered an ED-exclusion radius of r p = 50 m and an average noise power received at the BS of σ 2 b = −160 dBm/Hz; note that the default value of ρ b = 110 dB would give a value of P T = −50 dBm/Hz, or equivalently, a P T = 23 dBm for a bandwidth of 20 MHz, which is a typical power value for a micro-cell. Results show that very low P T values lead to a very poor performance since the average SINR of the LUs is very low (reliability constraint); on the other hand, when the transmit power is increased, there is a optimum value above which the EST starts decreasing, since the EDs are also increasing their detecting capabilities (secrecy constraint). Results also show that higher values of ρ e = P T σ 2 e degrades considerably the EST. We also observe that the performance of the first and second LU differs significantly as ρ e is increased. We must recall that in the adaptive transmission, the last user is ideally free of intra-cluster interference, and hence, its performance is limited by noise. Therefore, the second user is much more FIGURE 11. EST of the kth user versus the transmission power P t for adaptive transmission as a function of ρ e , with N = 2, R e = 1, r p = 50 m, λ e = 10 −5 points/m 2 and σ 2 b = −160 dBm/Hz.
FIGURE 12.
EST of the first NOMA user (k = 1) versus the transmission power P t for adaptive transmission as a function of λ e , with N = 2, R e = 1, ρ e = 90 dB, r p = 50 m and σ 2 b = −160 dBm/Hz. affected by the value of ρ e . In case of high noise power at EDs (low ρ e ) the second user is shown to outperform the first user despite being further from the BS. Fig. 12 shows the EST of the first NOMA user (k = 1) versus the transmission power P t for adaptive transmission as a function of the ED density, λ e . We observe that the optimum transmit power value is very affected by λ e . In fact, lower ED densities lead to higher EST, although an adjustment of the transmit power is critical to achieve such maximum. For the limit case of no EDs (λ e = 0) there is no EST degradation for high P T values, as the secrecy constraint is null. Fig. 13 shows a comparison between the average EST for adaptive rate and fixed rate schemes as a function of ρ b for different values of ρ e . EST results have been obtained by considering optimum values of R b (noted as R † b ) and R e (noted as R † e ), showing that EST performance for the adaptive rate scheme is always superior to that of its fixed counterpart.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyzed the performance of UL NOMA for a generic number of simultaneous users, both from a connection level perspective and from a physical layer security viewpoint. We considered a passive eavesdropping scenario in which the BS and LUs are not aware of their CSI, and different cases depending on whether the LUs use a fixed or an adaptive transmission scheme. We also considered the use of multiple antennas at the BS. Our analysis includes the impact of an imperfect SIC during NOMA detection and an ED-exclusion radius to enhance the secrecy metrics.
We obtained new analytical expressions for the coverage probability in the UL for LUs and EDs. In addition, we provide analytical expressions for the EST, which captures explicitly the reliability constraint and secrecy constraint of wiretap channels. Our analysis allows determining the wiretap code rates that achieve the maximum EST. Performance results also help designing optimum values of the transmit power (P T ) and the ED-exclusion radius (r p ) in order to enhance the overall EST.
Future work may include multiple antennas also at the transmitter side as well as the analysis of inter-cell interference.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The ccdf of the SINR for the kth user, p k (t), assuming M antennas at the BS, can be expressed as 
where (a) and (b) follow from the total probability theorem [41] , while (c) follows from the fact that H k has a Gamma distribution with ccdf given by (7) . 
being (x) = 2 F 1 1, α+2 α , 2 + 2 α , x .
Step (a) comes from the fact that the fading is independent of the BPP and, although jth users' location are correlated with kth user when their distances are ordered, the computation of the interference can be obtained considering that the N − k NOMA interfering users are located within a disk whose inner radius is r k and outer radius r c . Step (b) comes from the fact that the pdf of the distance from a randomly located point within that disk is given by f R j |R k (r j |r k ) = 2r j r 2 c − r 2 k . Note that the MRC combination does not change the distribution of the interference in our scenario, as stated in [27] , [42] .
In [43] , the marginal pdf of the kth nearest point to the origin of a BPP is given. In particular, this work shows that, in a BPP consisting of N points randomly distributed in a 2-dimensional ball of radius r c centered at the origin, the Euclidean distance R k from the origin to its kth nearest point follows a generalized beta distribution
Substituting (30) and (31) into (28) the proof is complete.
